China Is Exploiting America’s Social Divisions

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Argument An expert’s point of view on a current event. China Is Exploiting America’s Social Divisions Beijing-backed groups are using Asian American concerns for leverage. By Audrye Wong , a Jeane Kirkpatrick fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Francis de Beixedon , a research assistant in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. People hold signs as they gather for a rally protesting violence against Asian Americans at Sara D. Roosevelt Park in the Chinatown neighborhood in New York City. People hold signs as they gather for a rally protesting violence against Asian Americans at Sara D. Roosevelt Park in the Chinatown neighborhood in New York City, on Feb. 14, 2022. Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images My FP: Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. Subscribe Now | Log In Politics United States China March 6, 2025, 5:25 PM Comment icon View Comments ( 1 ) On July 28, 2024, thousands of demonstrators gathered at Foley Square in lower Manhattan. Hailing from Chinese communities across different boroughs in New York City, they waved American flags, carried signs saying “Justice for AAPI,” and chanted “Safe Homes, Safe Schools, No Shelter!” as they marched across the iconic Brooklyn Bridge and into downtown Brooklyn. This was the latest in a series of protests in recent months against a proposed homeless shelter to be erected in south Brooklyn, and was also in support of Councilwoman Susan Zhuang, who had been arrested at an earlier protest for allegedly biting a police officer. Present at this (and other similar events) was John Chan, a community leader and power broker who has been documented by the New York Times and Washington Post as having close ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the United Front, a Chinese government organ tasked with co-opting friends, neutralizing enemies, and spreading CCP influence globally. (Chan did not respond to a request for comment.) On July 28, 2024, thousands of demonstrators gathered at Foley Square in lower Manhattan. Hailing from Chinese communities across different boroughs in New York City, they waved American flags, carried signs saying “Justice for AAPI,” and chanted “Safe Homes, Safe Schools, No Shelter!” as they marched across the iconic Brooklyn Bridge and into downtown Brooklyn. This was the latest in a series of protests in recent months against a proposed homeless shelter to be erected in south Brooklyn, and was also in support of Councilwoman Susan Zhuang, who had been arrested at an earlier protest for allegedly biting a police officer. Present at this (and other similar events) was John Chan, a community leader and power broker who has been documented by the New York Times and Washington Post as having close ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the United Front, a Chinese government organ tasked with co-opting friends, neutralizing enemies, and spreading CCP influence globally. (Chan did not respond to a request for comment.) Trending Articles China Pledges a Trade Fight to the End China Brief on Beijing’s response to Trump’s tariff increases. Powered By Advertisement China Pledges a Trade Fight to the End X Reemphasized by Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “ magic weapon ” for achieving China’s national interests abroad, United Front work entails drawing on a variety of official bodies as well as quasi-official and civil society groups abroad. Activities can range from intelligence operations and transnational repression of CCP critics to murkier forms of influence to reshape political ecosystems in other countries, such as the co-optation of political and business elites and certainly influence over overseas ethnic Chinese communities. Amid a flurry of reports on Chinese agents and spies in New York , California , the United Kingdom , and elsewhere, United Front work poses threats, not only to U.S. national security, but also to the civil liberties central to multicultural democracies. If United Front actors are actively reshaping civic discourse and action in order to achieve Chinese government aims, this interferes with the healthy functioning of civil society, distorts the voices of Chinese American and Asian American communities, and undermines genuine political representation. Many speakers at the march wore matching blue shirts emblazoned with the logo of the Coalition of Asian Americans for Civil Rights (CAACR), an organization founded by Chan in 2015 as part of a response to concerns about discrimination against a Chinese American police officer. They declared a litany of injustices inflicted on the Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) community—decrying increased hate crimes, deteriorating public safety, the “unfair burden” of constructing homeless shelters in Asian-majority districts, and efforts to end standardized testing admissions to New York City’s elite high schools. These issues build on themes of identity politics often used by the political left while taking up the mantle of conservatives who slam progressive policies to address racial inequities—such as reducing police funding and supporting affirmative action in educational institutions—as leading to increased crime, weakened law and order, and heightened discrimination against white and Asian communities. The rhetoric adopted at this protest reflects a sophisticated and relatively new strategy by the United Front to activate a sense of threat to ethnic Chinese identity in the context of divisive political and social issues in host countries. United Front work has long targeted overseas Chinese, whether to pressure them to act as informants and spies or simply to create sympathetic support and pride in China, such as through Chinese-language schools, patriotic and cultural community events, or “roots trips” back to China. But now United Front actors are also seeking to mobilize ethnic Chinese communities by exploiting contentious “wedge” issues that are of tangible day-to-day concern in the countries they live in. These issues can be highly tailored and specific to local political and social contexts but often relate to themes of racial discrimination and political exclusion. The CCP actively seeks to drive wedges between overseas Chinese communities and the countries they live in, with the ultimate goal of increasing loyalty to China and the Chinese government. Read More Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump arrive for a photo session at the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 28, 2019. How U.S.-Russia-China Ties Would Impact the Indo-Pacific While U.S. allies worry, other states would welcome better great-power relations. Analysis | Derek Grossman A previous study by one of the authors found that Chinese government propaganda on WeChat—the dominant social media and mobile payment app for Chinese speakers globally—targeting ethnic Chinese in the United States was more likely than privately run accounts to amplify themes of racism and violence against ethnic Chinese and Asian Americans. Highlighting notions of exclusion and long-standing discrimination against Chinese in America—some of it rooted in truth—activates ethnic identities and makes diasporic Chinese more likely to seek support from those like themselves. Sign up for Editors’ Picks A curated selection of FP’s must-read stories. Sign Up By submitting your email, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to receive email correspondence from us. You may opt out at any time. Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up You’re on the list! More ways to stay updated on global news: FP Live Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up World Brief Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up China Brief Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up South Asia Brief Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up Situation Report Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up View All Newsletters Beijing’s efforts also extend beyond shaping the information environment to community mobilization on the ground. In addition to CAACR, Chan also founded another community association, BRACE, which formerly stood for Brooklyn Asian Community Empowerment but subsequently expanded its proclaimed mandate with a corresponding name change to Asian American Community Empowerment. These associations have been active in community organizing over AAPI-related issues for the last several years. The rise in anti-Asian hate crimes and concerns over public safety since COVID have provided fertile ground, although advocacy activities predate the pandemic. In 2016, CAACR mobilized thousands of people to protest the conviction of Peter Liang, a police officer who killed an unarmed Black man. Chan and other CAACR leaders argued that the justice system was discriminatory for convicting Liang but not his white patrol partner and that Liang was being scapegoated . Over the course of multiple demonstrations, CAACR members called for Asians to vote so that their voices would be heard, and Chan at one point stated that CAACR raised $300,000 for the Liang family’s legal fees should they appeal. When in 2018 the then-mayor of New York proposed changes to the Specialized High School Admissions Test, a standardized test seen as the gateway to elite public high schools for many Asian immigrants, CAACR held a press conference decrying racism and organized two protests . Proposed homeless shelters in Chinatown and south Brooklyn have been the focal point of recent protests, especially in the wake of two tragic killings of Asian American women by homeless men. In early 2022, the New York City Department of Homeless Services announced the addition of three homeless shelters to the Chinatown area, but canceled two under pressure from the community, leaving just one planned shelter at the site of a shuttered hotel on 91 East Broadway. The proposed “safe haven” facility, to help homeless individuals transition to regular housing, met with fierce local opposition, led by a coalition of community groups, including some with United Front links. Protesters also singled out a long-standing Chinatown nonprofit, Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE), which had begun talks with the facility operator in hopes of including Asian homeless persons and providing Chinese-language services but was not directly involved in the project construction. For example, the Fujian Hometown Association (described by Radio Free Asia as having close ties with and often acting as “ thugs ” for the Chinese consulate, despite the existence of internal leadership rivalries) and the America Changle Association (whose affiliates would later be arrested for operating an overseas Chinese police station in New York) picketed AAFE’s office and harassed employees. The United Fujianese of America Association (UFAA) insinuated that AAFE had ulterior profit-seeking interests in the real estate and construction contracts. These pressures caused AAFE to pull out of the talks. The UFAA even led a group in suing the New York City government and is currently appealing the case’s dismissal. (We attempted to contact the hometown groups for comment, but they did not respond to phone calls at their listed numbers and appeared to have no public email addresses.) United Front actors have not disguised the group identity basis of such mobilization and even openly referenced the perceived successes of other groups. In a 2024 interview, Chan stated : “Expanding the strength of the Chinese community is CAACR’s mission. The ability of only 6 million Jews to influence the U.S. government is a reference for the Chinese.” Chinese-language writings on the United Front also decry the loss of a strong Chinese identity among the diaspora and emphasize the importance of cultivating attachment to the homeland. Mobilizing ethnic Chinese on identity wedge issues serves to strengthen their sense of communal affinity with fellow ethnic Chinese and their views of the Chinese state as a protector or benefactor, while entrenching differences with broader American society and politics. Couching issues in host-country rhetoric disguises the hand of the United Front. A Chinese scholar at Huaqiao University, an institution directly overseen by the United Front Work Department that focuses on recruiting students from the global diaspora, noted in a Chinese journal that active overseas Chinese engagement in local political and social matters of their host countries would make them appear less like they are working for China, which paradoxically makes them more useful to the United Front. While United Front actors certainly care about and continue to mobilize on issues directly relating to China’s interests, such as Taiwan or Xinjiang, they are increasingly adept at capitalizing on the social and political trends of the countries they reside in. Nothing about the topic or appearance of the above activities is directly related to the Chinese state. But these activities are very much in line with—and laying the groundwork for—the objectives of United Front work at the very highest level. Linda Sun, a former aide to two New York governors who was recently arrested on allegations of working as a Chinese agent, was able to leverage her community credibility and political standing in service of Beijing’s interests. Building on her position as a community liaison for Asian constituents and claiming to represent their views, she was allegedly able to shape gubernatorial statements and activities, including blocking then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo from meeting the Taiwanese president and preventing then-Lt. Gov. Kathy Hochul from mentioning the detention of China’s Uyghur population in a Lunar New Year speech. Unfortunately, United Front actors have been quite skilled at co-opting societal rhetoric to gain currency. Sun spoke publicly about increasing diversity and representation in U.S. politics. Winnie Greco, a close aide of New York City Mayor Eric Adams who was also found to have deep ties with United Front organizations, came to prominence in her role as an Asian community liaison. At George Washington University, a group of Chinese students lobbied the school’s administration to tear down posters by a Chinese dissident artist, claiming that they incited “inter-ethnic hostility” and posed violent threats to the physical safety of Chinese students. When Adams criticized the anti-shelter protests as a sign of underlying racism against single Black men, CAACR quickly fired back at a press conference claiming that Adams was playing the race card to suppress the voices of ethnic Chinese. In a 2018 article, a vice director of the United Front Work Department attributed negative Western coverage of Beijing’s diaspora policies to underlying white supremacy and racial discrimination against those of ethnic Chinese descent. United Front mobilization on AAPI issues in the United States has leaned heavily into themes of fear, negativity, and an us-vs.-them mindset. Rhetoric centers on threats to community safety, whether through violent crime, illegal migrants, or homeless shelters, as well as the exclusion and neglect by political elites in power. This contrasts with more conventionally progressive treatments that highlight pride, diversity, and inclusiveness across Asian and often non-Asian groups. It is dangerous for U.S. national security and democracy to continue allowing the CCP to exploit and manipulate legitimate social and political issues for its own gain. But neither should such issues be dismissed as manufactured grievances, because they are not. Rather, policymakers and elected officials need to ensure they are hearing the right voices and proactively addressing community issues. Building up robust Chinese American civil society networks and legitimate Asian American grassroots organizations that reflect the community’s diversity will undermine Beijing’s claims to speak for all ethnic Chinese. China’s United Front will continue to exploit societal fractures and political grievances, and the centerpiece of a strong defense against Beijing’s interference will be proactively working to heal these fractures and address these grievances. Audrye Wong is a Jeane Kirkpatrick fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Francis de Beixedon is a research assistant in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Read More On Business | China | Politics | Race and Ethnicity | United States Join the Conversation Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription. Already a subscriber? Log In . 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