Trump Remakes the Security Order

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Analysis Trump Remakes the Security Order Nine thinkers on what’s next for Europe and Ukraine. February 24, 2025, 1:03 PM Comment icon View Comments ( 0 ) By Jo Inge Bekkevold , a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Donald Trump talks with Volodymyr Zelensky while someone holds an umbrella over Trump’s head. As president-elect of the United States, Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on Dec. 7, 2024. MATHILDE KACZKOWSKI/Hans Lucas/AFP/Getty Images My FP: Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. Subscribe Now | Log In Foreign & Public Diplomacy NATO United States China Russia Europe Ukraine U.S. President Donald Trump has long promised that he will end the war in Ukraine. If that remains the goal, there are two starkly different choices for achieving it. One is to enhance military assistance enabling Ukraine to regain territory currently occupied by Russian forces; the other is to lure the aggressor, Russia, to the negotiation table to stop the fighting. Trump has chosen the latter alternative. The United States has not only engaged Russia in peace talks in Saudi Arabia without the participation of Europe or Ukraine, it has also demanded that Ukraine hand over territory to Russia and huge swaths of its natural resources and economic infrastructure to the United States. Trump has ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine. In addition, Washington insists that European countries spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense and take on the responsibility to defend Ukraine, as the United States prepares to reduce its military presence in Europe. Even though U.S. officials have signaled that they still support NATO, the Trump administration is now driving the most comprehensive remaking of Europe’s security landscape since NATO expansion in the 1990s—or, if the transatlantic rift deepens, since NATO’s creation in 1949. U.S. President Donald Trump has long promised that he will end the war in Ukraine. If that remains the goal, there are two starkly different choices for achieving it. One is to enhance military assistance enabling Ukraine to regain territory currently occupied by Russian forces; the other is to lure the aggressor, Russia, to the negotiation table to stop the fighting. Trump has chosen the latter alternative. Three Years of War Trending Articles Israel’s Lapid Lays Out Alternative to Trump’s Gaza Plan The opposition leader’s proposal would see Egypt take temporary control of the enclave and oversee its reconstruction. Powered By Advertisement Israel’s Lapid Lays Out Alternative to Trump’s Gaza Plan X This story is part of a collection on what’s next for Ukraine and Europe. Read the full package here . The United States has not only engaged Russia in peace talks in Saudi Arabia without the participation of Europe or Ukraine, it has also demanded that Ukraine hand over territory to Russia and huge swaths of its natural resources and economic infrastructure to the United States. Trump has ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine. In addition, Washington insists that European countries spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense and take on the responsibility to defend Ukraine, as the United States prepares to reduce its military presence in Europe. Even though U.S. officials have signaled that they still support NATO, the Trump administration is now driving the most comprehensive remaking of Europe’s security landscape since NATO expansion in the 1990s—or, if the transatlantic rift deepens, since NATO’s creation in 1949. Indeed, the Trump administration seems to believe that helping Russian President Vladimir Putin save face and giving him much of what he wants in Europe is the best way forward. But to what end? There are at least three possible answers to this puzzle. First, giving in to Putin is the quickest solution to stop the fighting now. Second, it is the best possible way for Trump to create leverage to force Europe and Ukraine to make a whole range of economic, military, and other concessions to the United States. Third, by enticing Putin, the United States may be attempting to put a wedge into the China-Russia partnership. If we assume that the United States’ foreign policy is still informed by geopolitics, then its current approach to Ukraine and Europe suggests that it wants to settle the Russia-Ukraine war as soon as possible to enable a more comprehensive military rebalance in Asia, while simultaneously trying to play the Russia card in its larger rivalry with China. Accommodating Russia in Europe carries risks for the United States. In any global competition, Washington would be better off working with, rather than against, Europe—a continent that, despite its problems, retains much economic clout. And even though Europe is militarily weak now, this could change if the current trajectory of rising spending and greater security awareness continues. China is taking a great interest in the day-to-day unraveling of the transatlantic relationship. Speaking after U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that China and Europe are partners, not rivals. Europe has been in a tenuous process of de-risking itself from Beijing, but it may now find China more dependable than an erratic or even openly hostile United States. Finally, if Washington indeed has a larger strategic motive, it may be miscalculating the geopolitical logic of the China-Russia partnership. Trump offering Putin parts of Ukraine will not change Moscow’s view of Beijing in any significant way. With China focused on its rivalry with the United States in the Pacific, Moscow’s threat perception of Beijing is relatively low. Rather than causing a split between the two Eurasian powers, Trump is only enhancing Putin’s bargaining position. This story is part of a collection on what’s next for Ukraine and Europe. Read the full package here . Jo Inge Bekkevold is a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a former Norwegian diplomat. Read More On Alliances | China | Europe | Foreign & Public Diplomacy | NATO | Russia | Ukraine | United States | War Join the Conversation Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription. Already a subscriber? Log In . Subscribe Subscribe View 0 Comments Join the Conversation Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now. Subscribe Subscribe Not your account? Log out View 0 Comments Join the Conversation Please follow our comment guidelines , stay on topic, and be civil, courteous, and respectful of others’ beliefs. You are commenting as . Change your username | Log out Change your username: Username I agree to abide by FP’s comment guidelines . (Required) Confirm CANCEL Confirm your username to get started. 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